

AN ARTIFICIAL TONGUE WITH A NATURAL CURL

A.R. PRICE

On 20 June 2019, A.R. Price delivered a lecture to the New York collective Das Unbehagen, hosted by Jamieson Webster, Emma Lieber and Christie Offenbacher. What follows is a lightly redacted transcript (endnotes authorially supplied), established from the audio recording on the Das Unbehagen website by J.E. Madriz.

The text that features in the 2001 collection *Autres écrits* under the title ‘Joyce le symptôme’ is drawn from the written piece that first appeared in 1979 in the proceedings of the international Joyce symposium prepared and hosted by Professor Jacques Aubert at the Sorbonne in Paris four years before. Professor Aubert invited Lacan to give the inaugural lecture, and on 16 June 1975 Lacan spoke about Joyce and psychoanalysis in what sounds like a partially extemporized speech, including first-person reminiscences and biographical material about the writer, some of which is a little speculative. So, the lecture itself — of which there exists a just about audible recording together with a largely dependable transcript taken down by the psychoanalyst Éric Laurent — is very different in both style and content from the text that Lacan passed on to Professor Aubert for publication in the proceedings. The written piece is also rather different from the yearlong Seminar that followed the Sorbonne lecture: the eleven sessions delivered between 18 November 1975 and 11 May 1976, in the Law Faculty across from the Panthéon which crowns Mount Sainte-Geneviève in Paris. There has been some conjecture, inconclusive unfortunately, as to the date of redaction of the written text, given that a full three and a half years, and

perhaps longer (the month of publication is unrecorded in the colophon), stand between the Sorbonne lecture and the publication of the proceedings.

Anyone who has listened to the recordings of Seminar XXIII or read one of the transcripts will note that the sessions proceed somewhat freely, often enlisting last-minute findings delivered to Lacan by Professor Aubert or by the mathematicians Pierre Soury and Michel Thomé. The investigative character of the work is openly regretted for being at times more strongly akin to an academic research project than the carefully laid out construction of the former Seminars, with the material lurching back and forth between the mathematical knots, links and braids on the one hand, and the largely biographical and second-hand material relating to Joyce on the other. What are presented as occasional flashes of insight are seldom built upon or reiterated, arousing some suspicion as to whether they are to be thought as dependable as they might at first have seemed at this moment of public airing.

The written text published in 1979 is quite different. There is very little overtly biographical material relating to Joyce; no presentation whatsoever of the nodal figures. The word *nœud* [knot] occurs just once, and is particularized neither as 'Borromean' nor otherwise. Whilst Joyce's works are not on the whole cited explicitly using the conventional means of titles, quotation marks or footnoted reference, it emerges on more careful inspection that many fragments are lifted or adapted directly from the text of Joyce's books *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. Most crucially, however, a considerable portion of the text does not deal with the writer's output at all. After the mention of Joyce in the opening paragraph, he will not appear again until the bottom of the second page of this six-page text. Further along, a large measure of

the penultimate page is dedicated to the theme of sexuation and hysteria, in an interlude that is only tangentially related back to Joyce's writing.

This is where it becomes more vital to recognize that this 1979 text is the first writing of significant length from Lacan's hand since the Introduction to the German edition of the *Écrits*, dated October 1973. The brief two-and-a-half-page Preface to the English-language edition of Seminar XI is dated 17 May 1976, just one week after the final session of Seminar XXIII, but with the exception of a passing allusion to the work on Joyce at the end of the text there is scarcely any overlap with the Seminar material, Joycean or otherwise. The September 1974 Preface to François Regnault's translation of *Spring Awakening*, likewise a mere two and a half pages, treats essentially of the play itself, interweaving no more than a handful of remarks indebted to the discussion of *naming* in Seminar XXII. It seems, then, that Lacan exploited the foreseen publication of 'Joyce le symptôme' as the sole opportunity to set down in writing a certain number of key findings previously ventilated: in the two Seminars that preceded Seminar XXIII – perhaps as much and more than Seminar XXIII itself -- in the American lectures of 1975, and indeed in some material that was to feature in Seminar XXIV and even in Seminar XXV. That is to say, across these six pages the reader will encounter definitive and intensely deliberated formulations of material developed over some four years of public teaching, perhaps even five or six if the text is to be dated as late as 1978 or 1979. Thus we have a very different text from what is ordinarily assumed to be one that indulges a niche interest, devoted chiefly to art and sublimation, and which some prefer to regard as no more than the nostalgic wittering of an aged aesthete revisiting the fancies of his youth.

Having set out something of the historical context of the piece, what may be said summarily of the material it contains? The orthodoxy is that Lacan's early teaching followed Freud in bridging into neighboring disciplines — the structural linguistics of Jakobson, the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, the Hegelian dialectics of Kojève, Koyré's history of science, Russell's synopses of Frege and Cantor, and so on — but then gradually withdrew into a monadic and strictly independent version of psychoanalysis drawing occasional and tendentious support from topology alone. The most cursory familiarity with the Seminars of the 1970s gives the lie to such account; they are the month-by-month testimony of a thinker who is keeping fully abreast of recent findings across various fields and taking every care to make credited use of them in his teaching. Thus, alongside the on-going dialogue with later publications from both Kojève and Jakobson, who were working in a slightly different direction from that of their earlier work, we also meet in Lacan's late teaching, and in the text 'Joyce le symptôme' in particular, themes of considerable moment from then recent publications from Jaakko Hintikka, Saul Kripke and Edgar Morin. To these bibliographical references may be added the scholarly work of François Recanati on the philosophy of language, François Cheng on Chinese poetic writing, the aforementioned Aubert on Joyce and aesthetics, and Jean-Claude Milner on linguistics. Recanati, Aubert and Milner were each invited to give lengthy presentations at Lacan's Seminar, while Cheng was for many years in the 1970s his personal tutor in Chinese thought and history.

The Lacan who authored the late texts collected posthumously in *Autres écrits* was writing from a quite different position from that of the Lacan who authored the

texts assembled in the 1966 *Écrits*. The experience of the publication of the *Écrits* and its aftermath, together with the ever-swelling numbers that attended his Seminar, allowed Lacan rightly to suppose that he could now presume a sizable and moderately serious readership, or at least one that would engage to the extent of reading the written work in the context of the oral teaching, cross-referencing and extrapolating on the basis of other available material. This is surely one factor — though certainly not the only one — contributing to the allusive and cryptic style of the late writings. The relative availability of a wider array of traces of his prior teaching meant that the author of these late written texts could pack more into a sentence or a paragraph, or dispense with the conventions of academic referencing, in the knowledge that the sourcing would be performed by the sedulous reader he could now justly anticipate, while allowing for a degree of equivocation in his stance with respect to whichever author on whom he may be drawing: whereas a typographically acknowledged quotation or a footnoted reference might be construed as an endorsement of the author's position, even when the appropriated material is treated critically, a buried or silent allusion makes it incumbent upon the reader to isolate and detect the provenance, and then to consider what measure of distance might lie between the original source and its textual reappearance in Lacan's writing.

This factor also works in concert with the shift into what might be provisionally qualified as a more poetical style of composition in the late texts. Recall that different degrees of appropriation and quotation had become established as a distinctive trope in late-Modernist aesthetics, sometimes leaning more towards free or undeclared translation, sometimes more towards collage and *détournement*, but

such tactics seldom feature in texts that would be deemed theoretical, and Lacan's writings are incontestably designed to further the theorization and formalization of the analytic discourse.

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The appropriative device is most dramatically exemplified here in the opening sentence, where '*jeune homme*' has been seized directly from the title of Joyce's first published novel, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and though Joyce is mentioned in the sentence, the precise source is stubbornly held at the level of an undisclosed allusion. What instead is pushed to the fore is the theme of *naming*, by means of the homophony in French between *jeune homme* and *je nomme*. And so, with its many layers of intimation, this opening paragraph brings about an equivoque in the position of the first-person *I*. Is the *I* to be read as Joyce himself, who names himself both as 'Artist' and as 'Young Man' in the title of his novel? Indeed, as Lacan had insisted in the opening lesson of Seminar XXIII, the stress of Joyce's title falls squarely on the definite article: 'The'. 'He really reckons that, when it comes to the artist, he's the only one'. But the first-person *I* in this opening paragraph might equally denote Lacan himself, who here names Joyce 'Joyce the Symptom'. In this case, he would be harking back to the Sorbonne lecture, which bore the same title, and where he claimed to be enduing the writer 'with nothing less than his proper name,' even supposing that Joyce would have thereby 'recognized himself within the dimension of naming'. Note the somewhat intricate syntax here. It is not being supposed that

Joyce would have recognized the appellation 'Joyce the Symptom' as an adequate moniker; rather it is being asserted that Joyce would have been sensitive to Lacan's act within the dimension of naming in his regard. It may further be wondered how sensitive Lacan might have been in turn to Joyce's auto-nomination in *Finnegans Wake*: 'Shem the Penman', with its firm but curiously under-commented resonance with the Judaic שֵׁם [*HA'SHEM*], one of the names of God, or more precisely, 'the name of the Name', used as a place-holder to avoid uttering the true divine Name.ⁱ

The ambiguity in the first-person subjective attribution of *je nomme* is anticipated in the ambiguity of the curious word just before the colon, the elusive nonce-word *emmoi*. It resembles the French *émoi*, the state of turmoil or commotion that Lacan considered at some length in his tenth Seminar; yet in doubling the 'm' there is an amplification of the terminal *moi*, the first-person singular pronoun, 'me', and, of course, the 'ego' in psychoanalytic parlance. When voiced somewhat rapidly, one hears simply 'could anything else have been expected of me', but there is implicit suggestion of 'was anything else to have been expected of the ego', or even, 'of *aime-moi*', of the imperative to 'love me'. The informed reader may suspect some connection with the final lesson of Seminar XXIII, where Lacan delivers as a conclusive remark the identification between Joyce and his *Ego*, but there he employs unusually the Latinized *Ego*, rather than the French *moi*, and the point is not explicitly elaborated upon here in the opening to 'Joyce le symptôme'. We are left, therefore, to infer that the ambiguity itself is the element of significance, and that where in the 1975 lecture Lacan claimed to be doing a pastiche of Joyce, dropping in occasional portmanteau words reminiscent of Joyce's mischievous creations in *Finnegans Wake*,

here he performs this pastiching by first positioning himself in the place of an 'ego' that remains to be defined, and which will evolve in the following paragraph into a more sustained emulation of Joyce's strings of invented words.

The first paragraph contains a further literary allusion: *Jésus-la-Caille* — which would translate as 'Jesus-the-Quail' — was the title of a book by Francis Carco. Like Joyce's *Portrait*, it was the author's first novel, and was first published in 1914, the year that the *Portrait* was being serialized by Ezra Pound in the magazine *The Egoist*. Carco's novel is noted for its extensive use of the Parisian argot of the time, which it deploys to depict an underworld of pimps and rent boys, many of whom carry similar such sobriquets where the second part of the nickname is a metonymy relating to some figuration of the character it names: for example, Pépé-la-Vache and Dominique le Corse. Joyce had a fondness for these kinds of naming, as instanced in the aforementioned 'Shem the Penman' and the fraternal 'Shaun the Postman' from *Finnegans Wake*, or the many variants of 'Sinbad the Sailor' from Bloom's hypnagogic listing in the Ithaca episode of *Ulysses*: 'Sinbad the Sailor and Tinbad the Tailor and Jinbad the Jailer' &c., which also includes a 'Vinbad the Quailer', and the last of which, 'Xinbad the Phthailer' will feature here in Lacan's text in the guise lent it by the 1929 French translation of *Ulysses*: 'Xinbad le Phtharin'.ⁱⁱ The *caille* of Carco's title comes from the long-held notion that the quail was an amorous bird. In English, too, the quail was used in slang to denote a prostitute, and in American gay slang is used to denote an attractive young man, perhaps deriving from the French use.

To add another layer of nuance to the matter of nomination at stake in 'Jésus la Caille', I can relate that, some twenty years ago, working in a study group in Paris

dedicated to a deciphering of the text 'Joyce le symptôme,' Professor Aubert travelled up from Lyon at our invitation to participate in one of the sessions, which afforded the opportunity to ask him about this reference in the opening line. His reply came as something of a surprise: having invited Lacan to deliver the inaugural lecture at the Sorbonne congress, Aubert enquired as to the title Dr Lacan had chosen for his speech. When Lacan answered 'Joyce le symptôme', Aubert himself promptly responded off the cuff: 'as in *Jésus-la-Caille*?' To which Lacan cheerfully acquiesced. Aubert was understandably astonished therefore when he read the reference in the written text handed to him some time later. So, not only does the reference owe as much apparently to Aubert's initiative as to Lacan's, but indeed there is nothing to suggest that Lacan could claim any greater familiarity with Carco's novel than the title itself. We might deduce then that it is the name in the title of the novel, much rather than the content of the novel, that is here being foregrounded, just as the allusions to Joyce's first novel do not extend, here in 'Joyce le symptôme,' beyond allusions to the title itself and its aspect of auto-nomination.

These various names and acts of naming, especially those involving epithets or variations on agnomination (where a name is assigned its literal or homophonic sense) or on acronym, tie in with Lacan's reading of the foresaid Saul Kripke, whose recently delivered Princeton lectures on *Naming and Necessity* had just been translated by Lacan's young associate the afore-said Recanati. In these lectures Kripke takes issue with the so-called descriptivist theory of naming, where a name is bound to one or several of a cluster of properties supposed to belong to the object. Kripke maintains that these clusters cannot be regarded as forming a necessary or a

priori bind to the name, and puts forward the counter-argument that use of a name depends on a kind of initial 'baptism' which is kept alive by a community of language users, without this community having to share a common agreement or understanding as to each of the descriptions that might pertain to the object so named. Kripke's logical enterprise, which caused something of a storm in the early 1970sⁱⁱⁱ, is thus another concealed reference behind Lacan's use of '*je nomme*'. In '*je nomme*', Lacan is at once performing the act of naming as author of the expression 'Joyce the symptom,' and acknowledging the summoned community who in a sense keep alive Joyce's auto-nomination in the epithet 'the Artist as a Young Man'.

The name 'Joyce the Symptom' could be qualified as what is known as a 'descriptive name'. Kripke gives the example of 'Jack the Ripper'; a nomination cast in the same form as 'Joyce the Symptom'. Recanati later offered an absorbing take on the problem of descriptive names, arguing that they are:

created only in the expectation that more information about the bearer will accumulate, thus eventuating in the possibility of thinking of the latter nondescriptively. This possibility is simply *anticipated* by the use of a descriptive name.^{iv}

This encapsulates rather well the special temporality that Joyce's work so vigorously and emphatically brings to the fore: descriptive information is constantly deferred and postponed, to the point that he could jokingly assert that to establish such conclusive bonds between name and referent it would take generations of

academics somewhere in the region of three centuries. In the meantime, the reader grapples with a text that protracts its own time for understanding, and in the place of missing, withheld or ambiguated referents, one encounters instead the enjoyment of the writing; the enjoyment of he who wrote it and the enjoyment of we who read it. The anticipated certainty as to the identity of Joyce-the-Symptom equates with the anticipated certainty as to the meaning of Joyce's writerly enjoyment.

In the resolutely tendered nomination 'Joyce the Symptom,' it's hard to escape the sense that Lacan is replacing, supplanting even, Joyce's own auto-nomination of 'the Artist'. Lacan's increasingly refined use of the term 'symptom,' which becomes somewhat idiosyncratic in the 1970s, especially with the orthographic modification *sinthome* — sourced from the Bloch and von Wartburg etymological dictionary — is frequently matched with his discussion of 'art' and 'artifice' in the teaching of the mid-1970s. In the interview with students at Yale, Lacan says that: 'explaining art through the unconscious strikes me as highly suspicious, yet this is what analysts have been doing. Explaining art through the symptom strikes me as more serious'. Then in Seminar XXIII he asks, 'in what way is artifice expressly able to target what presents itself in the first instance as a symptom?' The thematic coupling of these two coeval sentences is compelling, so compelling in fact that it obscures their slight divergence. In the first case, the symptom is given the explicative role with respect to the art object; in the second, artifice is agentive, operating on the object-symptom. The tension inherent to the transit between these two perspectives will be fundamental to the complex development of the Seminar, where the epideictic often takes precedence over the agentive role of artifice. It's only in the written text that the

balance will tip decisively in the opposite direction, and this will depend on a finer sifting of the resonances of the terms 'art' and 'artifice'.

In its late modern acceptance, the term 'art,' and its derivatives 'artist,' 'artistic,' and so on, has a far shorter ancestral line than is commonly credited. Though the word 'art' can itself boast an antique heritage, its usage through until the modern era was quite different from the social, institutional and professional denotations today widely employed.

In a paper from the early 1950s that came to have a sizable influence, Paul Kristeller begins by taking it as read that until the 1700s, 'such dominating concepts of modern aesthetics as taste and sentiment, genius, originality and creative imagination' had not assumed their 'definite modern meaning', and proceeds to assert that 'at least a few scholars have noticed that the term "Art," with a capital A and in its modern sense, and the related term "Fine Arts" (Beaux Arts), originated in all probability in the eighteenth century.'^v Having by convenience extended the term 'art' for an assorted galaxy of distinct disciplines bearing more or less adequate names, one encounters now the historical emergence of the new signifier, 'artist', bringing with it notions as uncertain as they are apt to conjure up prosaic impressions of artistic 'sensibility' or 'disposition', the notion of 'artist' henceforth most fully divorced from a practice denoted by a verb.

The case is there for the making — and I will suggest that this is firmly implicit in Lacan's line of approach in the mid-seventies — that James Joyce's insistence on *The Artist* stands as a kind of historical punctuation that seeks to pin the signifier 'artist' in its new modern acceptance to a signified that exceeds not just the positions

of painter, sculptor and architect, but perhaps most especially that of *poet*, and that this he incarnates, not only in his outward cultural practice, but more intimately, symptomatically we might say, in his subjective dynamic and economy.^{vi}

This perspective allows us to account for a persistent feature of Joyce's writing to which Lacan is peculiarly sensitive: when at the end of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* the central character Stephen Dedalus summons the paternal agency that would enable him to launch into his newly chosen career, he does not call upon Apollo, the God of Poetry, or any of the various muses — Calliope, Euterpe, and so on — instead he voices an unprecedented appeal to the 'artificer', a term which itself is, if not a coinage, then at least a somewhat esoteric appellation. The filial link is established through connotation of the mythical father-son couple of Daedalus/Icarus, but we remember that Daedalus was neither poet, nor sculptor, nor painter. He is represented as a kind of master craftsman and inventor, skilled in the fashioning and above all in the improvising of one-of-a-kind structures that range from the architectural to the mechanical, and from the fanciful to the fantastic. So, while some kind of invocation of a continuity with the antique may be inferred or tentatively mooted, there is no tradition or canon associated with a 'Daedalien' practice. Where Ezra Pound at a vital turn in his early poetic career summoned Propertius, the Roman poet of the first century CE^{vii} as kindred ancestor of his anti-imperial stance, or where J.H. Prynne turned at near age to the legendary nomadic Aristeas, said to have wandered possessed by Apollo,^{viii} each thereby reasserting a specifically poetic heritage of lyric activity, Joyce's Daedalus was never even remotely

aligned with a tradition or discipline, artistic or otherwise. In his inventions, he is unparalleled and inimitable.

William York Tindall, whose 1959 reader's guide to Joyce was one of the principal bibliographical sources for Lacan's twenty-third seminar, reads Joyce's use of the term 'artist' as an 'irony of ironies'. We learn from Tindall that in Ireland, 'the word "artist" means deceiver or faker'. First highlighting in the famous closing line of *A Portrait* Stephen's wish to 'forge in the smithy of my soul,' Tindall notes the nether side of this wish as its return in the figure of Shem, the forger as faker and trickster, as 'sham'.^{ix}

The name Daedalus has been traced to *daidállō* meaning 'work' or 'craft,' from the Proto-Indo European verbal root **delh*, meaning 'to hew' or 'to split'. Lacan often favors near synonyms over the term of 'art': 'artifice', the 'artisanal', and then quite simply the French verb *faire* with its various nuances, at once making and doing, forming and fashioning, and above all 'fact', which lies at the root of the painterly 'facture' and the fraudulent 'counterfeit'. *Faire* will in turn conjoin with *savoir* as *savoir-faire*, a key term of Seminar XXIII. In one respect this is a generalising of Joyce's practice such as Lacan understands it, in order to draw from it something of potentially wider application, but it respects at the same time the Joycean position of operating outside of an established poetic or even literary tradition.

Twice in Lacan's written text 'Joyce le sympôme,' we meet the term 'tête de l'art'. In this tightly constructed piece, when a word or phrase makes a second appearance, it may be ascribed not simply the magnitude that ought to be supposed of each of the terms in the text, but a very special, quasi-conceptual, status that calls

to be teased out through comparison of the intratextual occurrences and the variations between their use. The French expression *tête de lard*, with a 'd', is a pejorative term, usually an insult, to label someone 'pig-headed' in the sense of obstinate, unyielding or uncooperative. It is one of a constellation of similar terms: *tête de nœud*, *tête de linotte*, which approximate English invectives such as 'meathead' or 'airhead'. The post-positioned 'd' is silent in French, and so Lacan's coinage 'tête de l'art' would be perfectly homophonous with it when uttered. The implication must be that of an obstinacy in one's art, in the sense of being unyieldingly devoted to art.

Yet this obstinacy is also pitched bi-vocally. One might forgivably suppose only the art practitioner, the artisan, to be so unswervingly dedicated to his art, but the text gives us to understand that this is a generalized condition, a condition of 'man,' in consequence of his 'having a body'. Indeed, there is a further condition: 'he denatures himself by the same stroke'.

What are we to make of this pervasive, seemingly universal, 'denaturing'?

In his Columbia University lecture on 1 December 1975, Lacan notes that taking as one's starting point a division between Nature and Culture, as do the structuralists, is not so straightforward.^x The reference to 'the structuralists' is willfully fudged. Clearly he is referring to Lévi-Strauss, whose discussion on the Nature/Culture distinction had earlier been a solid reference in his teaching, but the indication is both weighty and consequential, because once again Lacan can be observed to be equipping himself with a new set of conceptual reference points where it might otherwise be tempting to read his late position in continuity with the earlier. One of these references is Edgar Morin's then recently published *La Nature de la*

Nature, the first book of what was to become a six-volume project under the title *La méthode*. Lacan supplies the title explicitly in the lesson of 17 May 1977 from Seminar XXIV.

As Morin has it, ‘western physics not only disenchanting the universe, it devastated it’, and so may ‘privatively be defined as: that which has no life.’^{xi} But Lacan’s position is perhaps more radical than Morin’s, for where Morin has it that ‘physics denatured the universe’ by tearing Nature’s secrets from her, Lacan would assert in this same lesson that: ‘Nature’ is an inordinately vague notion; that: ‘In truth, the unnatural is clearer than the natural’. In ‘Joyce le symptôme,’ it is written that once ‘man’ has ‘denatured himself’, he ‘assumes the natural as his goal, as the goal of art, such as he naively imagines this natural’. This echoes Morin’s concluding remark that:


we see that the nature of what distances us from Nature constitutes a development of nature, and brings us closer to what is most intimate in the Nature of Nature. The Nature of Nature is our nature. Our very deviance, with respect to Nature, is animated by the Nature of Nature.^{xii}

By Lacan’s reckoning, this deviance, this denaturing, is concomitant with the fact of naming that we looked at earlier.


Lacan had dedicated a considerable portion of the final lesson of his twenty-second Seminar to an inquiry into naming and the real, insisting on Kripke’s line that the referent of a name is absolutely not an individualization of a support at the level

of a body. There is a 'realism of the name,' as distinct from a 'nominalism of the real' which ultimately does no more than append a name to an imaginary form.

Lacan sets the dimension of naming apart from the three registers of imaginary, symbolic and real. It ties in with the other registers when instantiated through the act of naming. Naming may for example partake of the imaginary (which Lacan designates as N subscript i) or of the symbolic (N subscript s), which means it can operate within the signifying system, within the Saussurian model, but in both cases there will be a referent on the side of the real. The nomination, the naming, as opposed to the name itself, entails the real, this being the 'realism of the name'.



Realism of the name



Nominalism of the real

Lacan contrasts the early logicians' efforts to name what they imagine to be real with the naming of the species in Genesis 2:19–20, which opposition is further developed in the opening lesson of *Seminar XXIII*, picking up where *Seminar XXII* left off:

What specifies Nature *per se* is that it is not a nature, hence logical process as a means of broaching it. Through the process of calling *Nature* that which you exclude by the very fact of taking an interest in something, this something becoming differentiated on account of being named, Nature ventures nothing save to affirm itself as a potpourri of what is not in the nature of anything.

He proceeds to look at natural kinds and species ('from bacteria to birds, because they do have names') from both the Biblical and Aristotelian approaches, which correspond to N_s and N_i respectively.

The commentary on the Biblical approach (N_s) foregrounds the necessity of the fault-line, the gulf, between language and the real. The proliferation of names merely swells the gulf between the signifier and the real of nature. The critical effect is that through naming, the real is affected: nature is de-natured.

The question of naming natural kinds stands at the crossroads of the two perspectives: N_s and N_i . From the perspective of N_s there is the problematic of the 'natural' (the de-naturing of nature) and the introduction of a hole in the real. From the perspective of N_i there is the problematic of the proper name as taking aim at a referent through description of imaginary form; a problematic which Kripke extends to include natural-kind terms, indeed which he views as a logical extension of the wider issue of naming.

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These considerations ease our advance into the second paragraph of the text, 'Joyce le Symptôme', where now there is a play on words between the 'phonetic', and the 'faunetic', the latter being Lacan's manner of acknowledging the local sites where natural kinds and species feature as names. This fauna pertains most specifically to 'man', the same man that we meet in the 'Young Man' of Joyce's title, but now generalized to cover mankind in general, the plural 'men' who in the previous sentence eagerly line up under the name 'man'. A further intimation may be detected here to the faun, the Roman *phaunos*, the bipedal creature, half-animal, half-man, that is to say, inter-special, and especially the concupiscent and indecorous being who disturbs and upsets established order, just as the phoneme can disturb the function of a signifier by working against its standard inscription in a letter. The awakening faun of Mallarmé's *L'après-midi* is surely close at hand.

Why does Lacan write *l'homme* as *LOM*? Throughout the Hebrew text of Genesis Chapter 1-3, so concerned with naming, we find the term אָדָם [HA'ADAM]. *Adam* is quite literally 'man', with an ambiguity between *this one fellow here* and *mankind* in general. Note, however, the appended definite article, the 'Yidua', הַ. This is why at the start of Seminar XXIII Lacan says that Yahweh's act of naming is congruent with Charles Sanders Peirce's definition of the index. It's a matter of *pointing* and *saying*, with all the comic ambiguity that Quine exemplified so memorably with his 'gavagai' index. Lacan replicates the Adamic index by providing his own translation: LOM. LOM is a proper name derived from the common noun *homme* prefixed by the definite article *l'*.

LOM

אָדָם

You can see the ambiguity that this creates when considered from the angle of signification. It's the ambiguity that one meets in the text of Genesis, especially given the absence of modern orthographic conventions like capital letters, hyphens or apostrophes in the Ancient Hebrew text. The fall of man, his lapse, is both Adam's fall and the fall of all mankind.

Most crucially however, *HA'ADAM* is the one who, now equivocally named, can himself bestow names. He is the *jeune homme* who can say, *je nomme*. 'Whatever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof'.

In the opening lesson to Seminar XXV, Lacan asks 'is neurosis natural?' His reply is that it is, but only in so far as in any given man there is a symbolic, compelling in turn to examine what can be said of the 'nature of nature'. On this matter of the nature of nature, it is asserted that we can say no more about it than that there is something of which we have some imagining that it may be accounted for by the organic, the latter to be taken as 'living beings'. However, the fact that there are living beings is not only lacking in self-evidence, but, says Lacan, it required the lucubration 'of an entire genesis'. Is 'genesis' here intended in the modern sense of genetics or in the Biblical sense, with its attendant acts of naming? The answer is *both*: 'I mean', says Lacan, 'that what have been called "genes" surely means to say something, but it's merely a meaning to say'.

To return now to the theme of art and the symptom, we can note an evolution in the reference to 'art' through the progression of Seminar XXIII and on into the written text 'Joyce le Symptôme'. At the start of the Seminar, the question of art is being drawn towards a technical question of interpretation. The interpretation is fashioned as an equivoque on meaning, the equivoque that: 'frees up' something of the symptom by resonating in the body. These considerations are in continuity with many earlier such observations in Lacan's teaching. However, as the Seminar on *The Sinthome* develops, we meet a conception of art as coming to the place of the Other of the Other that does not exist. The particular mode of doing connoted by the term 'art' is a know-how, a *savoir-faire*, a 'knowing how to do,' but specifically a 'know-how' that comes in the place of the Other of the Other. It is thus also a 'know-how' that has to do with jouissance, especially the jouissance of the Other, God's jouissance, which we cannot know. 'The real Other of the Other, that is, the impossible, is the idea that we form of artifice, inasmuch as it is a form of making that eludes our grasp, that is, which far exceeds the jouissance that we can derive from it'.

In the text 'Joyce le Symptôme,' this question of jouissance is met in the theme of contrast between Joyce and his character Bloom, and between the position of the artist and the position of the saint. Lacan writes, 'Joyce is not a Saint,' thereby echoing the line from *Ulysses*, 'Cousin Stephen, you will never be a saint'. The line is in fact in turn an echo of a remark that Samuel Johnson supposes John Dryden to have said to Jonathan Swift on the occasion of his first published poem: 'Cousin Swift, you will never be a poet'. Lacan implies that Joyce derives too much enjoyment from his art to be a saint; he is too proud of his art, and too obsessed with the body and its various

activities and emissions. Hence the notion of a return to the nature of man, to the fauna of man, in the obscene. *Ulysses* was famously the subject of a charge of obscenity, leading to its banning in the US,^{xiii} and Lacan reads this obscene, this *eaub*, as the necessary flipside to the beautiful, to the *beau*, to the aesthetic beauty that was such a commanding preoccupation for the young Joyce.

eaub
—
beau

And so, in the stead of the saint he cannot be, Joyce creates Bloom, the saintly man, to be the ‘tête de l’art’, the ‘art-head’, that pushes up ‘obstinantly,’ like a flower head, like a natural kind, on the stage of art.

* * * * *

Which of these two positions is more appropriate to the analyst: the position of the enjoying artist, or the position of the saintly man, that is to say, in the terms of ‘Joyce le Symptôme,’ the ‘ptypical symptom’ or the ‘*saint homme*’? Clearly these are two different ways of approaching the unconscious, of positioning oneself in relation to speech and the fact of the speaking being, but above all in relation to the knowledge that constitutes the unconscious.

Here in the written text ‘Joyce le symptôme,’ over the term ‘unconscious’ Lacan prefers another, of his own mint: the *parlêtre*. *Parlêtre* is one of the most insistently

recurring coinages in Lacan's late teaching. Having been introduced in the oral teaching back in 1974,^{xiv} it would have to wait until 'Joyce le symptôme' to receive its full sanctioning in a written text. At the end of 1975, in his lecture at Columbia University, the term is defined in relation to a so-called 'vicious circle': the fact that there are *beings* who speak, but who derive this notion of 'being' solely through the fact of speaking. The very belief that there is such a thing as 'being' is there labelled a '*folie*', a madness or a foolishness.^{xv}

The folly of being stems from the further illusion that one *is* a body. The corrective issued many times over in Lacan's late teaching, and which features recurrently here in 'Joyce le symptôme,' is that man 'has' rather than 'is' a body. Yet Lacan's ambitions for the term *parlêtre* were more expansive still, and while in the written text he seems to poke fun at the whimsical notion that his new expression should 'supersede Freud's UCS' [*se substituera à l'ICS de Freud*], earlier comments show that to his mind the two terms were fully equivalent,^{xvi} suggesting that this is being proffered with an eye to overhauling the Freudian lexicon (alongside other such rectifications as *hainamoration*, to replace the 'misbegotten' term *ambivalence*, and so on). Thus far *parlêtre* might seem to be synonymous with *être parlant*, speaking being, or else *être parlé*, spoken being, but nestled into the coinage is a second nuance, closing and sublating the said 'vicious circle,' namely a homophony with 'par lettre'.^{xvii} In speaking, the speaking being leaves traces, and these traces call for a reading, this to provide in turn a substantiation for the unconscious. The unconscious is what comes to be known from reading, to the letter, the traces left by speech once the authorial attribution has been left beyond retrieval.

These traces have the status of knowledge, here in the text inscribed in the formula ‘the unconscious is a knowledge *qua* spoken,’ but to be revealed as such there is a double requirement of invention — ‘what is discovered is discovered in one go’ — and inventory, taking stock of the successive formations of the unconscious. This is a reapplication of a comment that some twenty years earlier was tendered in cautious attribution to Freud (the source is unattested): that the inventory of the unconscious ought to be made promptly, before it should close up once more.^{xviii} The text now segues into one of these sentences so characteristic of the late writings of Lacan, where the tight concatenation allows of various and even slightly divergent parsing:

La parole bien entendu se définissant d’être le seul lieu, où l’être ait un sens.

The main verb conjugated in the present participle indicates that this sentence is effectively a prolongation of the previous, which itself was an extension of the second that in turn built upon the first. That is to say, the whole paragraph (including the final sentence, yet to come under our consideration) is not only thematically coherent, but constructed as a single grammatical sentence. The chief task of this new sub-sentence is therefore to conclude the definition of the *parlêtre*. The same two component-terms are granted recurrence: *parole* and *être*. Indeed *être* appears twice. *La parole* is ‘speech’. This is followed by ‘bien entendu,’ a common locution approximating the English ‘naturally’ or ‘of course’ (and which is even permissible in English as an accepted Gallicism), lending the sentence a jaunty

or familiar tenor, but which would at the same time belie the careful and eminently 'written' style of the text, where each word carries its own special weight and nothing is to be taken as read. Thus 'La parole bien entendu' is to be taken also to the letter, as 'speech heard well'. Strictly speaking this is orthographically forbidden by the default masculine form of *entendu*, where it would have to read *bien entendue* to offer a less equivocal signification, but the reading becomes persuasive from the context: the unconscious is to be inventoried, and to do so, one has to hear it, and hear it well. For the *parlêtre* to convert to *par lettre*, speech has to find its point of address in an alert hearer.

The doubling of *être* in the sentence stands in playful contrast to the assertion of a single locus, *le seul lieu*. And more playful still is the very declaration that this is a definition, when the defining terms slip and slide. Speech, when heard well, is the sole locus . . . and then: comma. Such abruptly dropped in commas are another signature feature of Lacan's late writing, coaxing what first presents as a prose style towards a poetic conceit. This is no longer the pastiching of Joyce that marked the opening paragraphs, where the effort demanded of the reader was to unriddle the plausible significations packed into the portmanteau words. Here the style nears the one first exploited to maximum effect in 'Lituraterre,' where familiar words are arranged in deceptively straightforward sequence, until a single crystal comes to infect the entire solution. The reader might well wish and expect the sentence simply to read: 'Speech . . . is defined as the only place where being has a meaning'. Many would-be commentators have indeed negligently suppressed the comma in their paraphrastic citations; yet this comma stiffly forbids such a univocal and seemingly sensible

reading, forcing the now attuned reader to re-parse. Could it be a more radical proposition, namely that for the speaking being, there is but one locus in his universe? This would lend the sentence a radically Heideggerian aspect: man dwells in language — here specifically spoken language — and nowhere else. An anticipation of this ‘nowhere else’ has already been provided in this paragraph, in its opening (sub)sentence: ‘*il ne l’a d’ailleurs qu’à partir de là*’ [‘he’s got it nowhere besides but on that basis’]. Man has his body, and he ‘lives on being,’ but paradoxically this having of a body is achieved on the sole condition of having voided being, of having emptied it out. Again, the seemingly off-hand collocation *d’ailleurs* is here dually purposed, evoking an elsewhere in its very negation. There is no *ailleurs* where man would have a body; only here, where he voids his being, in speech. The echo of Mallarmé’s broken message in ‘Un coup de dès ...,’ to be constituted by flight from one sequence of upper-case letters to the next, is especially marked: ‘RIEN . . . N’AURA EU LIEU . . . QUE LE LIEU’.

So, having marked time with this comma, the other terms in the sentence start to become more suspect. The two-word grouping *l’être* looked at first to be a generic mass noun prefixed by the definite article, a standard form in French (where the noun would be zero-marked in English). But the run on from sub-sentence to sub-sentence calls forth the likelihood that *l’* is more than a mere ‘function-word’ (*mot-outil*) here, that is to say, that it is semantic and not merely grammatical, that is to say, that it is not an article but a pronoun, transforming in turn the status of *être* from existential to copulative.

où l'être ait un sens

┌ Being
└ to be so

And so the task of the reader is then to examine which of the nouns or adjectives above might lend support to this construction. If it is a matter of 'being this', or 'being so', or 'being as much', then the most compelling candidate is that of 'LOM', which otherwise is left peculiarly undeveloped in the paragraph. The new signification that thus arises is: 'Speech well heard is defined as the sole locus, and here being LOM has a meaning'. This derives further backing from the following sub-sentence: 'Le sens de l'être étant de présider à l'avoir'. If read as 'The sense of being this, i.e. being LOM, is to preside over having,' then the reader is faced with a refiguring of the formula that has already been posited above and which will return severally below: *LOM a*, man has. Has what? A body.

* * * * *

The following paragraph gives further run to the foregrounding of the *parlêtre* as this local conjunction of speech and being (where 'to be' can only be 'to be LOM qua having'). The thematic of *hearing* gently led in by the understated *bien entendu*, now to recur in this new paragraph, here contrasts with a thematic of *viewing*. The opening two-word group, *L'important*, is another common French locution, meaning 'what is important', or 'the important thing', but with the reader alerted to play between the

definite article and the pronoun, the question arises as to whether *important* might not be functioning verbally as well as nounally. Thus the conveyance from one paragraph to its successor is performed linguistically by this importation from one location to the next. Further corroboration of this trope comes from extratextual reference to 'Lituraterre', where *m'importe* and *l'important* are used punningly to connote Lacan's importation into the university discourse and the importation of Chinese writing into the Japanese language system;^{xix} but at the intratextual level, this also offers a motive for the otherwise redundant resumption in the next sentence, '*Ce qui importe donc, sans préciser d'où*' ['The import therefore, without specifying whence']. While this parsing opens onto two different readings that are somewhat at variance, Lacan's playfulness is also designed to prompt a return to the etymology of *importance*, where the meanings converge in worth ascribed to that which has been imported, by the very lengths to which one has gone to do so.

If something is being imported in this new paragraph, what might that be? Semantically, what is at issue here is the importation of *being* into the realm of *having*. Since 'having a body' is principal, and only the epistemic, here lambasted as an 'epistemic shambles' or 'gibberish', gets them the other way round, this paragraph may be taken as a critique of epistemic logic.

Where earlier we saw Lacan in dialogue with Saul Kripke on the question of naming, and then we extrapolated parallels from Lacan's mention of Edgar Morin and *The Nature of Nature*, here we can understand Lacan to be replying to another of his contemporaries, the Finnish thinker Jaako Hintikka. What Lacan objects to in Hintikka's thought is how, within the epistemic framework, any knowledge such as it

might be supported by the fact of *not knowing that one knows* is deemed strictly inconsistent.^{xx} This synopsis of the epistemic position occurs in the lesson of 19 February 1974, where Lacan notes that he has read the 1969 *Models for Modalities* and the 1973 *Time and Necessity*. The former, quips Lacan, is to be read as an example of what not to do.

The antique notions that Lacan perhaps entertains as the forerunners of the false epistemic position are such theses as Aristotle's that: 'actual knowledge is identical with its object' (*De Anima* III 6. 431a1–2) or Plato's that: 'knowledge is perception' (*Theaetetus* 152d). When here in 'Joyce le Symptôme' Lacan refers to epistemic logic as that which 'sets to shoving around the world at large' ['se met à bousculer le monde'], he is reframing his remarks from February 1974 on how 'whenever one takes a state of the world as one's point of departure, in order to point out some truth, one goes barking up the wrong tree'. This form of knowing, dependent on hypotheses and setting its sights on truth, is pitted against unconscious knowledge: the knowledge that, as we saw earlier, depends not on hypothesis but on invention, thus maintaining a more complicated relationship, or non-relation, with truth.

* * * * *

Such notions of the actual state of the world and possible worlds are central to the epistemic position. In one of the essays from *Time and Necessity* Hintikka pores at length over Aristotle's discussion of 'future contingents', considering in particular the

Aristotelian example: ‘it will either be true to say that a sea fight will take place tomorrow or else true to say that it will not take place tomorrow’. Hintikka considers that Aristotle is not interested merely in the apparent determinism of the truth-value of statements made about future events such as they will obtain sooner or later, but rather, or also, the problem of what the status of such statements does to his entire system of thought, his epistemic framework. As Hintikka puts it, ‘Aristotle’s problem is thus primarily that of *omnitemporal* truth — or, more accurately, that of *infinite past* truth — rather than that of *future* truth’. His problem is how to ‘avoid the collapse of possibility into actuality,’ and to do this, the solution he finds is ‘to say that what really counts as showing what is possible at a moment is not what is true of this one moment of time’. This ‘not what is true of this one moment of time’ is Hintikka’s rewording of Aristotle’s ‘things that are not but may possibly be or not be,’ or else ‘things that are not always so or are always not so’.

These are the same problems that the reader finds Stephen Dedalus pondering in the Nestor episode of *Ulysses*. Teaching a history lesson to his class of young pupils, Stephen’s mind keeps wandering to his readings of Aristotle in the Saint-Geneviève library in Paris (which, as it happens, stands just across from where Lacan would deliver his Seminar on Joyce some seventy years later):

Had Pyrrhus not fallen by a beldam’s hand in Argos or Julius Caesar not been knifed to death. They are not to be thought away. Time has branded them and fettered they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities

they have ousted. But can those have been possible seeing that they never were? Or was that only possible which came to pass?

The class turns to a reading of Milton's *Lycidas*, a poem composed in homage to Milton's then recently deceased friend, Edward King. In the poem, the drowned King is imagined as 'not dead / Sunk though he be beneath the watery floor,' thus presenting an example of a counterfactual, a possible world, that was 'ousted'. Stephen continues to muse:

It must be a movement then, an actuality of the possible as possible.

Aristotle's phrase formed itself within the gabbled verses [. . .].^{xxi}

This preoccupation would carry over into the Oxen of the Sun episode: 'what of those Godpossibled souls that we nightly impossibilise'; and indeed on into *Finnegans Wake*, where 'a sequentiality of improbable possibles' on page 110 is part of a sustained paronomasia on the modal categories of Aristotle, or rather, 'Harrystotalies'. Lacan seizes on these layers of reference and cogitation as the opportunity to offer his own concise definition of the possible, here in 'Joyce le Symptôme': The only definition of the possible [is] that it may *not* 'avoir lieu', it may *not* 'take place'. The now-attuned reader will hear the echo of Aristotle as reformulated by Hintikka, the sea fight that may not 'take place' and the 'things that are not but may possibly be or not be', but above all will hear the intratextual contrast with *le seul lieu*, 'the only place,' the 'only locus', the locus of speech, the place of the

parlêtre. The possible elsewhere of that which *may not take place* is thus not the unconscious as a negative entity, but the fantasy, that is, the image of an elsewhere, and so eminently visual — a vision — leaked, as it were, from Stephen's room of infinite possibilities,^{xxii} wrought though it is from the only stuff there can be, the stuff of speech.

Like Mallarmé in his 'Un coup de dès ...,' the sole locus is complemented by a *peut-être*, a maybe: 'RIEN . . . N'AURA EU LIEU . . . QUE LE LIEU . . . EXCEPTÉ PEUT-ÊTRE UNE CONSTELLATION'. [Nothing will have taken place but the place, excepting perhaps a constellation].^{xxiii} Mallarmé's possible constellation poses the question of the configuring of signifiers as knowledge: the signifiers exist, but the knowledge they configure exists only, as it were, through the brilliance of the effects they achieve from their juxtaposition. This brilliance is not merely a matter of joining the dots; it depends on an effect, and calls upon a superimposition, entailing in turn a dimension of invention.

The progress we have made through these first lines and paragraphs of the text 'Joyce le Symptôme' is no more than a few paces into a text that has many more conundrums and intricacies in store, but they allow for the securing of an initial approach to the enigmatic conclusive remark in the penultimate paragraph: 'Être post-joycien, c'est le savoir'. We have been prepared for the grammatical ambiguity of 'le savoir' since it is modeled on that of 'l'être' in 'où l'être ait un sens' and 'Le sens de l'être'. On one hand, post-Joycean Being is knowledge, but on the other, to be post-Joycean is to know it, to know so.

Être post-joycien, c'est le savoir

┌	Post-Joycean Being	┌	is knowledge
└	To be post-Joycean	└	is to know so

Being is to be found in the only locus there is, that of speech, and when this speech is heard well, it crystallizes, it configures, it constellates, it becomes effective, in the letter. There is a condition of knowledge here, provided one knows, following the example of Joyce, that knowledge is an effect of the signifier, and neither a confirmed hypothesis nor a truth-value. That is to say, knowing so is to know that not all knowledge is knowing that one knows. There is, not what Hintikka calls 'knowledge *simpliciter*', but what Lacan calls 'the principle of knowledge that one knows without knowing so',^{xxiv}

What about psychoanalysis in all of this? Why is this Being post-Joycean and not post-Freudian?

Freudian knowledge still aims at the concept, at the conceptualisation, even the symbolisation, of unconscious knowledge. The superposition that is called for, the inventive dimension, resists the concept, and is an artful fashioning that allows the brilliance of knowledge to shine, as it were, legibly; to superpose, without screening or dulling the constellations of signifiers.

And what teaching may be extracted from it regarding the place of the analyst?

To repeat the question posed a moment ago: which is more appropriate to the analyst: the position of the artist or that of the saint? Lacan positions Joyce on the side of the artist-symptom, and repeats the line from *Ulysses* that Joyce-Dedalus is 'no saint,' just as Dryden is said to have teased Swift for being 'no poet'. In other words, this is a wisecrack that may well entail a hefty dose of antiphrasis, even if unintended from its utterer. But if Joyce is 'no saint,' it is on account of his jouissance, on account of his enjoying too much, too much at least to occupy the position of the rejected scrap of object jouissance for another, which is how Lacan had qualified the position of the analyst in *Télévision*. There, in this very public televised address, the model for the analyst was Baltasar Gracián's *discreto*, the discreet man, the circumspect and unremarkable courtier. To the extent that he does enjoy, from time to time, he is inoperative in his analyst-function. Which implies a certain abstinence, a certain prudence. Yet this is not all sobriety and solemnity. 'The more saints there are', says Lacan, 'the more one can laugh'. And this is a principle carried over to his last major written text, 'Joyce le Symptôme': *Que le saint en rie*, that says it all.

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ⁱ Jonathan Warren Pickett is perhaps the first to note this concurrence, in his PhD thesis on *Finnegans Wake*, where in the name ‘Shem’ Joyce is reckoned to have ‘insisted a version of his own name into the text, but has thus, instead of signing it outright, produced instead of his name a name for that name which happens to mean “name”.’ Pickett, J.W., *Finnegans Wake: The Agency of the Letter in the Conscious*, Vol. I, Chapter 3, 2008, p. 267.

ⁱⁱ The 1929 translation was accomplished by Auguste Morel, Valéry Larbaud, Stuart Gilbert and Joyce himself. Lacan reproduces their rendering, only omitting, perhaps by haplography, the second aitch: ‘Xinbad le Phtarín’. The 2004 translation gives ‘Xinbad le Phthailleur’ (p. 911). Cf. Fritz Senn, ‘“Ithaca”: Portrait of the Chapter as a Long List’ in Gibson, A., *Joyce’s “Ithaca”*, Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1996, pp. 73–74:

some mutations – Kailer, Yailer, Phthailer – owe their nominal identity more to the *élan vital* of the technique (or its intrinsic *nisus formativus*) than any profession or allusive descent. Most of the appellations hover between jingling, child-game nonsense and symbolic exploitation. [. . .] Towards the end, the conventional order of the letters seems feebly to be asserting itself, with a cluster of initial consonants to be found towards the end of the Greek and Latin alphabet. The final item, ‘Phthailer’, is latently reminiscent of the word family *phthi(n)*, surviving in *phthisis*: to waste away, wane, dwindle, and is therefore a suitable fade-out ghost word.

ⁱⁱⁱ Kripke was amplifying an observation already put forward by Peter Geach in 1969:

For the use of a word as a proper name there must in the first instance be someone acquainted with the object named. But language is an institution, a tradition; and the use of a given name for a given object, like other features of language, can be handed on from one generation to another; the acquaintance required for use of a proper name may be mediate, not immediate. [. . .] It is not our knowledge of this chain that validates our use, but the existence of such a chain’. (Geach, P.T., ‘The Perils of Pauline’ in *Logic Matters*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1972, p. 155).

Cf. Kripke in *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 93: ‘It is not how the speaker thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain of communication, which is relevant’. Originally termed ‘causal theory of reference’, Kripke has since indicated his preference for the label ‘historical chain picture’.

^{iv} Recanati, F., *Direct Reference*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 180; and again in *Mental Files*, 2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 157–8.

^v Kristeller, P.O., (1951) ‘The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics Part I’ in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 12(4):497. This account has not been without its critics,

cf. notably: Porter, J.I., (2009) 'Is Art Modern? Kristeller's "modern system of the arts" reconsidered' in *British Journal of Aesthetics* 49:1–24.

^{vi} A similar thesis can be deduced from Thierry De Duve's argument that in the Duchampian era, 'art' had become a proper name (*Kant after Duchamp*, MIT Press, 1996, pp. 3–86).

^{vii} Pound, E., (1917) *Homage to Sextus Propertius*, first published in *Quia Pauper Amavi*, London: Egoist Press, 1919. See also Niall Rudd 'Pound and Propertius: Two Former Moderns' in *The Classical Tradition in Operation*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

^{viii} Prynne, J.H., (1966) 'Aristeas, in Seven Years', first published in *The English Intelligencer*, (2)1: 277–9 & (2)8:377 for the bibliography; then together in *Aristeas*, London: Ferry Press, 1968, pp. 7–13.

^{ix} Tindall, W.Y., *A Reader's Guide to James Joyce*, New York: H. Wolff, 1959, p. 67. Tindall repeats the observation in *A Reader's Guide to Finnegans Wake*, London: Thames & Hudson, 1969, pp. 131–3. Cf. *Finnegans Wake*, pp. 181–2, especially: 'one day to utter an epical forged cheque on the public for his own private profit'; and: 'Who can say how many pseudostylic shamiana, how few or how many of the most venerated public impostures, how very many piously forged palimpsests slipped in the first place by this morbid process from his pelagiarist pen?'

^x See also Lacan's lecture in London in February 1975: 'There is no opposition between nature and culture. Nature is an idea of culture.'

^{xi} Morin, E., *The Nature of Nature*, translated by J.L. Roland, New York: Peter Lang, 1992, p. 382 [modifying 'privately' to 'privatively', to accord with '*privativement*'.]

^{xii} *Ibid.*

^{xiii} In 1921, the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice instigated obscenity charges against the editors of *The Little Review* after they published the 'Nausicaa' episode of *Ulysses* in their July/August 1920 issue. The trial concluded in a ban of the book, a decision that was to be reversed only following a later case, in 1933.

^{xiv} First used in Rome in 1974, in the press conference of 29 October, and again three days later in 'La Troisième' (1 November).

^{xv} *Scilicet* 6/7(1975): 49.

^{xvi} During the Rome press conference: 'Le parlêtre, c'est une façon d'exprimer l'inconscient'. During the 26 January 1975 Study Day in Strasbourg: 'Parlêtre, ce qui se trouve être une autre désignation de l'inconscient'.

^{xvii} It is uncertain as to whether Lacan explicitly brings out this nuance in his teaching. The only conceivable instance comes in the closing remark to the lesson of 17 December 1974 from Seminar XXII, when he says: 'ces êtres qui ne parlent pas seulement à être, mais qui sont par l'être/lettre', leaving some leeway as to how this last signifier might be heard and subsequently transcribed.

^{xviii} Cf. (1955) 'Variantes de la cure-type' in *Écrits*, Paris: Seuil, 1966, p. 333: 'l'avis, apocryphe ou non, où l'humeur du maître prend après coup valeur de prévision, d'avoir à se presser de faire l'inventaire de l'inconscient avant qu'il ne se referme'.

^{xix} Lacan, J., 'Lituraterre', in *Autres écrits*, Paris: Seuil, 2001, p. 14: 'Mais il m'importe dans un autre que j'épingle [. . .] du discours universitaire'; and p. 19: 'Qu'il y ait inclus dans la langue japonaise un effet d'écriture, l'important est qu'il reste attaché à l'écriture [. . .]'

^{xx} Lacan's passing critique was anticipated, most probably without his knowledge, and without reference to Hintikka, by the slightly more involved discussion by David B. Annis, rejecting Keith Lehrer's 'entailment theory' of knowledge, in his 1969 article 'A Note on Lehrer's Proof that Knowledge Entails Belief' in *Analysis* 29:207–8, later consolidated in

Annis's 1977 review article, 'Knowledge, Belief, and Rationality' in *Journal of Philosophy*, 74:215–25. A more direct critique of Hintikka's epistemology was performed by Kripke in his 1972 lecture at Cambridge University 'On Two Paradoxes of Knowledge', but was not officially published until much later (in redacted form in Kripke, S.A., *Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Vol. I*, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 27–51) and thus as such was almost certainly unknown to Lacan; Kripke's main lines of argumentation did, however, filter through to some in the philosophical community, as evidenced by the correspondence in appendix to his printed text.

^{xxi} These lines from *Ulysses* aided Jacques Aubert in tracking down Joyce's source-texts for his readings in Aristotle, which in the appendices (A & B) to *The Aesthetics of James Joyce* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992) are identified as the Barthélémy-Saint-Hilaire translations of the complete works of Aristotle and Victor Cousin's partial translation of the *Metaphysics* (accompanied by a report on a number of contemporary dissertations presented on the same topic); more conjecturally, Aubert observes some resemblance between the passage cited above and themes in Ernest Renan's doctoral dissertation on *Averroës et l'averroïsme*.

^{xxii} Compare, however, Wallace Stevens' 'Prologues to What is Possible', and notably the commentary by J.H. Prynne in *Concepts and Conception in Poetry* (Cambridge: Critical Documents, 2014), describing first on p. 32 the uneasy co-existence of the factual and counterfactual worlds: 'It is needful that this substitutive universe should not altogether erase its real-world counterpart, since productive anxiety about the incomplete fit between these two worlds is also a main feature of this poem's conceptual self-endangerment'; then, after brief discussion of Adamic naming, the conclusive argument on p. 36 that 'What is Possible' 'cannot yet carry naming-terms: only the nominated but unfulfilled possibility of them.'

^{xxiii} Mallarmé's constellation is identified in the poem as the Septentrion, that is, the seven stars of the Ursa Minor. Stellar constellations, famously, have no physical existence; only the stars that compose them can be said to have existence (in the scientific sense), yet as Jean-Claude Milner has contended, they do 'offer themselves to view', such that 'their brilliance makes their inexistence an existence' (Milner, J.-C., 'Les constellations révélatrices', translated by C.R. Gelder as 'The Tell-Tale Constellations' in *S: Journal of the Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique*, 9(2016):31–38).

^{xxiv} Lacan, J., Lesson of 21 December 1976, from *Seminar XXIV*.